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ANTITRUST
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Does Not
Immunize Drug Manufacturers'
Communications
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware held the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine does not protect brand name manufacturers'
communications to the general public and health care industry.! Generic
drug manufacturers who alleged various antitrust violations, including
monopolization and attempted monopolization of the generic warfarin
drug market instituted the actions against defendant, the manufacturer of
brand name warfarin, Coumadin.2 Additionally, purchasers of warfarin
from the period of July 28, 1997 to the present also initiated a class action
suit.3 The issue before the court was defendant's motion to dismiss all
claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).4
The basis for plaintiffs allegations involved actions taken by
defendant to petition the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to alter
their generic drug approval process for drugs with a narrow therapeutic
index (NTI). 5 NTI refers to drugs for which too little of the drug ill not
be effective while too much of the drug can lead to life-threatening
conditions.6 Warfarin is a drug with a narrow NTI! Defendant owned the
patent for warfarin.8 However, the patent was set to expire near the same
time defendant began petitioning the FDA for changes in the drug
approval process. 9
Plaintiff alleged, as a result of negative
communications, anti-competitive rebate schemes, market retention
agreements, and inventory management agreements, defendant hindered
plaintiff's entrance into the market of generic warfarin resulting in inflated
prices of Coumadin.'0

t

In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, No. MDL 98-1232-SLR, 1998 WL 883469,
at *I (D.C. Del. Dec. 7, 1998).
2Id.

3Id.
4Id.

5

1d. at *2.
1n re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 1998 WL 883469, at * 2.

6

7Id.
8

1d.

9

d.
' 07d. at *2, 4.
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The court began its decision with an explanation of the NoerrPennington Doctrine, which provides antitrust immunity for entities
engaged in petitioning the government even though the effect of their
efforts may be to restrain or monopolize trade." The doctrine is a twopronged test.' 2 The first prong of the doctrine asks whether the suit or
proceeding is objectively baseless. 3 The next prong addresses whether a
defendant has anti-competitive motivations.14 Even if the defendant has
anti-competitive motives, Noerr-Pennington still protects his right to
petition so long as the suit is not objectively baseless.' 5 The
communications at issue were: a petition to the FDA to adopt stricter
bioequivalence standards and to postpone all generic warfarin until such
standards had been implemented, 6 a petition to the United States
Pharmacopeial Convention, Inc. (USP), 17 to adopt brand name Warfarin's
uniformity specifications as the official standard, 8 and communications
to the general public through marketing initiatives which inferred
Coumadin was safer and more efficacious than generic warfarin. 19 The
marketing initiatives included revision of a computer software program
with a warning about switching to generic substitutes, creation of a
lobbying group to exclude NTI drugs from state generic substitution laws,
a publicity campaign emphasizing brand warfarin's tighter uniformity
standards in comparison to USP standards, press releases asserting
substitution from brand to generic warfarin requires additional testing, and
press releases claiming the FDA had received numerous reports of adverse
drug events resulting from patient substitution of generic warfarin.2
The court began reviewing each action alleged to constitute antitrust
violations. 2' The court concluded defendant's actions in petitioning the
FDA and the USP were protected by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.22

"In re WarfarinSodium Antitrust Litigation, 1998 WL 883469, at *6.
21d.at *7.
'
13
Id.

"Id.

15Id.
"6In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 1998 WL 883469, at *2.

"The USP is the official pharmaceutical compendium and listing in the USP is necessary
for acceptance of the product in the medical community.
"In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 1998 WL 883469, at *3.
19Id.
201d.at *3, *4.
21
id"

"2Id.at *8, 9.
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However, the court found defendant's communications to the general
public and health care industry as well as defendants rebate and market
retention agreements did not enjoy Noerr-Pennington immunity'
Consequently, the court upheld plaintiff's actions for violations of the
Sherman Act, the Lanham Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, New York
general business law and New York common law based on defendant's
communications to the general public and health care industry and
defendant's rebate and market retention agreements.2 4
Finally, the court addressed the class action aspect of the complaint.'
The court found the class action plaintiffs to be indirect purchasers of
Coumadin.26 The court also concluded any injury sustained by class
plaintiffs was too remote to sustain an antitrust action 2 7 Consequently,
the court dismissed all class action complaints. 28 In re Warfarin Sodium
AntitrustLitigation,No. MDL 98-1232-SLR, 1998 WL 883469 (D.C.Del.
Dec. 7, 1998).

BANKRUPTCY

Unllquidated Medical Malpractice
Damages May Be Exempt From
Bankruptcy Creditors
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri
held unliquidated medical malpractice damages are exempt from
bankruptcy creditors, provided debtors take affirmative action to declare
the damages as exempt.29
This consolidated opinion of two factually identical cases involved
an Objection to Claim of Exemption filed by creditors of the estates. 30
Debtors were injured in motor vehicle accidents, after which they
experienced complications of surgical procedures necessitated by the
"'Inre Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 1998 VIL 883469, at *10,11.
*11.
S1d. at *18.

241d. at
2

26Id. at *19.
27

1d.

'8in re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 1998 WL 883469, at *20.
'In re Brooks, 227 B.R. 891 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998).
3"Id. at 892.
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accidents. 3 ' Debtors filed medical malpractice lawsuits against their
treating physicians.32 Debtors also filed bankruptcy petitions, on which
schedules they did not disclose the pending litigation, and later amended
the schedules to include the medical malpractice causes of action as
exempt assets. 33 The creditors filed objections to debtors' claims of
34
exemption.
The court held unliquidated medical malpractice claims involving
personal injury may be exempted from creditors' claims, if debtors
affirmatively declare unliquidated claims as exempt. 35 The court noted a
bankruptcy estate is composed of all property in which the debtor has a
legal or equitable interest at the filing of the case. 36 Therefore, the court
continued although debtors' initial unliquidated claims were part of the
bankruptcy estates when originally filed, because the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure allow debtors to amend their schedules to claim
exemptions otherwise omitted, debtors may properly amend their
bankruptcy schedules to include the unliquidated assets of their medical
malpractice lawsuits.37 Accordingly, the creditors' claims were
overruled.38 In re Brooks, 227 B.R. 891 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998).

Sole Shareholder Not Employee Of
Medical Corporation Under ERISA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held physicians
who are the sole shareholders of a medical corporation cannot protect their
profit-sharing plans from creditors by claiming to be employees of their
corporations for purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security
39
Act (ERISA).

31Id. at 892-94.
32d
331d
4
Brooks, 227 B.R. at 892-94.
351d. at 893-94.

36Id. at 893.

7
3'
1d. at 894.

3

Sd.
39Watson v. Proctor, 161 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 1998).
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This claim arose pursuant to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy action filed by
defendant. 40 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel declared defendant's profitsharing plan did not constitute an employee benefit plan protected by
ERISA and the defendant appealed.4' Defendant is the sole shareholder
of a medical corporation providing anesthesiology services4 2 As part of
his compensation, defendant receives contributions to aprofit-sharing plan
established by the corporation.43 Defendant alleged the denial of ERISA
protection violated his constitutional right to equal protection and the
Department of Labor exceeded its authority by establishing ERISA
regulations. 44
The court began by addressing defendant's constitutional
challenges. 45 The court noted the text of ERISA does not define the term
employee. 46 Therefore, to determine whether an individual who has dual
status as an employer and an employee could constitute an employee for
ERISA purposes, the court looked to the Department of Labor
regulations. 47 Department of Labor regulations provide individuals vho
are employees of a corporation wholly owned by those same individuals
are not employees for purposes ofERISA.43 The court then concluded the
Department of Labor acted within its scope of statutory authority when
issuing the pertinent regulations.49
The court briefly addressed the defendant's claim of equal protection
by noting the standard for such an evaluation is a rational basis test."0
Because the legislature clearly had a rational basis for enacting such a
classification, the court rejected defendant's equal protection claim."
Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed."2 Watson v.
Proctor,161 F.3d593 (9th Cir.1998).

40

Id. at 594.

41

id.
Id.

42

43

1d. at 595.
161 F.3d at 595.
4"Watson,
5
1d.
4Id.
at 596.
47
4

1d.

1d. at 597.
49
vatson, 161 F.3d at 598.
50

1d.

52Id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Statute Requiring IIV Positive Individuals
To Inform Sexual Partners of
Their HIV Status Is Constitutional
The Court of Appeals of Michigan held a state statute requiring human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive persons to inform sexual partners
of their HIV status prior to engaging in sexual penetration fell within the
state's compelling interest in protecting its citizens and was therefore
54
constitutional.53 Under the statute, failure to inform was a felony.
In 1997, defendant, who was HIV-positive, was convicted of three
felony counts of engaging in sexual penetration without first informing her
partner of her IlV status.
Defendant appealed, arguing a statute
compelling disclosure of one's HIV-status was unconstitutionally56
ambiguous, and violated both her rights to privacy and to free speech.
The court held statutes are accorded a strong presumption of validity
absent any clear showing of unconstitutionality. 7 Application of the
overbreadth doctrine usually occurs "where an overbroad statute prohibits
constitutionally protected conduct." 58 Defendant stated because the statute
compelled not onlyprior notification to consensual sexual penetration, but
also required victims of non-consensual sex, who were HIt-positive, to
inform their attackers, the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. 9
However, the court found defendant failed to establish how the statute
broadly and improperly included both types of conduct. 6' Rather, the
court concluded, defendant's criminal behavior clearly fit within the
statute's wording. 6' The court held the legislative intent in the statute was
a general intent, not requiring a specific mens rea.62 In addition, the court
continued, "[t]he right to privacy [was not] absolute; [but was] qualified

53People

v. Jensen, 586 N.E.2d 748, 750 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).

at 750.
5
"1d.
at 751.
56
"Id.

1d.

'Id. at 750.
"Jensen, 586 N.E.2d at 750.

191d. at 751.
60

6

1d. at 752.

ZId.

62

1d. at *753.
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by other rights." 63 A right to privacy was not a shield protecting all
private sexual acts from state regulation. 64 "[T]he state has a compelling
interest in discouraging the spread of the HIV virus. 65 Thus, the court
reasoned, compelling an infected person to inform all of his sexual
partners so the partner can make an informed decision... furthers the
state's interest in preventing the spread of the virus."' 6 Defendant was not
required by statute to publicize her HIV status; rather her only duty was
to inform, privately, a partner prior to sexual penetration. 67 Such a
partner, who remained uninformed, would be in immediate danger of
exposure to the virus. 6' Therefore, the state's interests in controlling a
currently incurable disease outweighed defendant's right against
compelled speech. 69 The court afred the constitutionality ofthe statute
and the defendant's conviction in question.70 People v. Jensen, No.
210655, 1998 L 549283 (Mic. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1998).

DAMAGES
Tort Reform Cap To Be Computed In
Present Day Value of Money
The Supreme Court of California held the recently enacted Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA)7 ' required the cap on damages to be
computed in present day value for recovery, which extended into the
72
fAture.
The underlying action involved a malpractice claim against the
county to recover damages sustained by an infant as a result of injury
during birth.73 Thejury awarded non-economic damages ofS650,000 for
'Jensen,586N.E.2d at 756.
6Id.

'1Id.
6Id.
67Id. at 758.
6
Jensen,586N.E.2d at 759.
69

701d.

1d.

71MICRA is a state tort reform statute, which places economic caps on damage recovery in

a professional negligence action.
72Salgado v. City of Los Angeles, 967 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1998).
73
d at 587.
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past and future pain and suffering. 74 MICRA provides, in a claim against
a health care provider, an award for future damages greater than $50,000
may be paid out in installments rather than in one lump sum if either party
requests. 75 Furthermore, MICRA also provides an economic cap of
$250,000 for non-economic losses in professional negligence actions
against health care providers.76 Consequently, the court applied MICRA
to the infant'sjury award and after subtracting the $10,000 award for past
pain and suffering, awarded $240,000 to plaintiff, to be paid in monthly
77
installments over the course of the infant's life expectancy.
Plaintiff objected to the cap of $240,000, arguing the award should
be the future value of $240,000, if invested over plaintiffs lifetime.78
Accordingly, plaintiff initiated this action.79 The court began by
examining the jury's intent in arriving at the award of $550,000.80 The
court concluded the jury intended the award to be a calculation of the
future pain and suffering in terms of present day value.8 ' For this reason,
the court found the statutory cap should have been applied to the amount
plaintiffwould have received in one lump sum payment at the time of the
judgment.8 2 The court continued by announcing that all future cases
involving jury verdicts in actions against health providers must include
express jury instructions the damages the jury is calculating should be
computed in the present day value of money. 3 Salgado v. County ofLos
Angeles, 967 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1998).

74

Id.
76Id.
76

1d.

78Salgado, 967

1d.

P.2d at 587.

79

1d.

'Old. at 645.
81

Id. at 646.
' 23Salgado, 967 P.2d at 646.
1d. at 646.
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DISABILITY
Statutes Limiting Access of Disabled Persons to Housing
Preempted by ADA and FHAA, but Zoning
Exception Reasonable Accommodation
The United States District Court for the Eastern District ofWisconsin held
Wisconsin statutes forbidding a community living arrangement within
2,500 feet of another similar facility were not facially invalid. The court
also held these statutes limited the meaningful access of disabled
individuals to housing and were therefore preempted by the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Fair Housing Amendment Act
(FHAA)-8 The court finally held under the FHAA, a proposed zoning
exception was a reasonable 6accommodation to the rights of disabled
persons in attaining housing.8
Plaintiff owns and operates housing in ten countries for the
developmentally disabled. 7 Plaintiff purchased single family homes in
defendant community with the intention of converting them into
residential homes serving disabled adults.83 Aware the homes were less
than 2,500 feet from existing group homes, plaintiff sought special zoning
permission for waiver of the spacing zoning requirement.69 Residents in
defendant community hired an attorney after learning ofplaintiffs' plans.'
The attorney then presented defendant records containing allegations of
misconduct by plaintiff institution, its employees and staff." Plaintiff
responded some of the incidents mentioned occurred at its homes for the
mentallyill, not only at those intended for the developmentally disabled.
Public hearings were held and defendant's Common Council denied

'Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. Greenfield, 23 F. Supp. 2d 941,951 (E.D. Wis.

1998).

MId. at 952-53.
5
Id. at 958.
87Id. at 948.

'8Id. at 949.

'90conomowoc,

'Id.

91

d.
92Id.

23 F. Supp. 2d at 949 (citing WIS. STAT. § 62.23(7)(i)1) (1998)).
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plaintiff s request for a spacing waiver and denied permission to operate
the homes. 93 Both parties moved for summary judgment.94
Reviewing the facts presented, the court held plaintiffs failed to
establish the facial invalidity of the spacing law because it would not
impact the disabled in every instance.9 The court then found the FHAA
explicitly, and ADA implicitly, expressed congressional intent that acts
protecting the disabled preempted any conflicting law.96 Because nothing
in the record established the Wisconsin provision qualified as an
exemption, the court found nothing to establish a justification for the
spacing law.97 Further, the court found no evidence establishing disabled
individuals presented a public health or safety threat to other community
residents.98 As a result, the court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 99 Plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment was granted
on the issue of liability, but was denied with prejudice upon request for an
order permanently enjoining defendant from reviewing licensure.0 0
Oconomowoc Residential Programs,Inc. v. Greenfield, 23 F. Supp. 2d
941 (E.D. Wis. 1998).

Employer's Inquiry About Job
Applicants' Medical History May
Give Rise to ADA Claim
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held applicants,
who are not disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
cannot be asked questions about their medical history on job
applications. 10 1 If employers do so and subsequently deny applicants
employment, employers may be subject to liability under the ADA."12

93

Id.

940conomowoc, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 949-50.
9'1d. at 951.
96
Id. at 952.
97Id. at 954.
98Id.

9Oconomowoc, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 958.

100id.
'Griffin v. Steeltek, 160 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3496, 67

U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1999).
'02Id.

at 592.
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Plaintiff sought employment at defendant's company, but was not
hired despite being told he was the best-qualified applicant.0 3 Defendant
had inquired on the employment applicationwhether plaintiffhad received
Worker's Compensation or Disability Income payments, and whether
plaintiffhad physical defects, which would preclude him from performing
certainjobs.'0 Plaintiff responded he had suffered third degree bums to
his hand and foot, and had undergone elbow surgery and a shoulder
sprain. 05 Plaintiff filed suit under the ADA, which prohibits employers
from inquiring whether applicants have a disability or about the nature of
the disability unless the inquiry is job-related.0 6
The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment
because plaintiff had failed to allege he was disabled or perceived as
disabled under the ADA's definition, and therefore had not established a
prima facie case of disability discrimination.0 7 The court opined the
purpose of the ADA is to eliminate questioning that would serve to
identify and exclude disabled persons from consideration for
employment. 03 However, the appellate court interpreted legislative intent
to indicate the ADA was not to be an exclusive listing of persons to be
covered.' 9 Therefore, the court held even ifajob applicant is not disabled
or perceived disabled, he can state aprinafaciecase under the ADA if
questions such as those defendant asked are posed to job applicants."'
The appellate court held plaintiff suffered an injury in fact because
defendant denied him employment due to his responses to the
impermissible questions."' Accordingly, the appellate court reversed and
remanded the case for trial." Gnffin v. Steeltek Inc., 160 F.3d591 (l Oth
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L. W. 3496, 67 U.S.L. W. 3508 (U.S. Apr.
19, 1999).

103Id.
10

4Id.

6Griffn, 160 F.3d at 594.
'7Id. at 592.
03
1d. at 593.
' Id. at 594 n.4.
"ld.at 592.
"Griffin, 160 F.3d at 595 n.5.

"21d. at 595.
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Cavity-Filling Procedure Not "Direct
Threat" Under ADA
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on remand
established a cavity-filling procedure did not pose a direct threat to
defendant."' The issue on remand from the Supreme Court of the United
States was whether performance of the cavity-filling procedure by
defendant dentist posed a "direct threat," hence qualifying as an exception
4
to the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).1
Plaintiff, who was human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive
and asymptomatic, went to defendant, who diagnosed a cavity."'
Defendant refused to perform the procedure in his office." 6 Plaintiff sued
defendant claiming a violation of the ADA." 7 An earlier determination
in the suit established asymptomatic HIV infection may qualify as a
disability under the ADA."' The issue on remand required the court to
reevaluate several aspects ofprevious evidence." 9 Plaintiffs evidence, in
particular 1993 Center for Disease Control (CDC) Guidelines, stated
utilization of universal precautions "should reduce the risk of disease
transmission in the dental environment."'" 0 The court concluded the
guidelines were satisfactory evidence cavity-filling procedures are safe
when universal precautions are implemented.2 2 The court also discussed
the appropriate weight to grant the policy, which established the policy for
dental procedures on patients in determining dentists' safe activity. ' The
court questioned whether the policy might be based partly on ethical
obligations, rather than pure scientific assessment. 2 3 The court
determined the policy settled any doubt about its scientific foundation

n3Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87,90 (1st Cir. 1998),petitionforcert.filed,(U.S. Mar. 24,
1999) (No. 98-1536).
" 41d.at 88.
5
11
1d.
"71d.

"'See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
"'Abbott, 163 F.3d at 88.
"Ol1d.
at 89.
121id.
12Id.
13Id.
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because the scientific and ethical policies were settled in independent
procedures.' 24
Second, the court examined whether defendant presented any
evidence adequate to establish a genuine issue of material fact about the
issue of any "direct threat" posed by the cavity-filling procedure.1 s
Specifically, the court looked at defendant's evidence of seven cases
deemed "possible" patient-to-dental worker HIV transmissions.12 6 The
court determined subsequent publications clarified that "possible" meant
the CDC was unable to conclude whether the dentists were infected
occupationally. 27 Furthermore, the court determined evidence of the risks
23
to other health care workers was not comparable to the risk to dentists.
Based on the reexamination of the evidence, the court upheld plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. 129 Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87 (1st
Cir.1998), petitionfor cert.filed, (US.Mar. 24, 1999) (No. 98-1536).

Diagnosed Mental Illness Does Not Relieve
Plaintiffs of Establishing Ability to Pe
form Job In ADA Claim
The United States District court for the Eastern District of New York held
plaintiff failed to demonstrate he was able to perform the essential
functions ofhis job, despite a diagnosis of mental illness. 3 ' Accordingly,
plaintiffcould sue neither the individual employer's officials nor the union
under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA).'
Plaintiff had worked for Long Island Bus (LIB),a subsidiary of the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) from 1986 untilDecember
9, 1995. During the course of plaintiffs employment, Local 252
represented him in collective bargaining agreements (CBA) negotiated
between LIB and Local 252.132 According to plaintif, defendants
'24Abbott, 163 F.3d at 89.
1
'5d.
26
Id. at 89-90.
12 7
Id. at 90.

'Id.
twAbbott, 163 F.3d at 90.
13Corr v. MTrA Long Island Bus, 27 F. Supp .2d 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
"'Id.
132Id.
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conspired to cause his discharge from employment.133 Plaintiff alleged in
supporting his claim a denial of a promotion, a second unprecedented
examination for a promotion, constant work surveillance, being taunted
by other employees, and being followed from work to home.'34 Plaintiff
also alleged he had been having mood swings, sleeplessness and anxiety
from May 1989 through July 7, 1994, and that he had notified MTA's
nurse and Local 252's Location Chief of these symptoms. 3 On July 7,
1994, plaintiff suffered a stress-induced nervous breakdown, and
ultimately was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. 36 Plaintiff did not work
at all from July 9, 1994 through October 12, 1994, and worked
sporadically from October through December 1994.137 Plaintiff was
terminated effective December 9, 1995 for being 'absent from work for a
period exceeding one year. 13' Article III, Section 2(d) of the CBA,
January 20, 1995, permitted his dismissal. 139 Plaintiff brought a claim
stating defendants terminated him due to his disability, in violation of the
ADA, and that the discharge violated a written employment agreement
between plaintiff and defendants. 41 In response, defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment.
A plaintiff filing an ADA claim bears the burden of establishing a
primafaciecase, and in order to do this plaintiff must prove,
(1) his employer is subject to the ADA;
(2) he suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA;
(3) he could perform the essential functions of his job with or
without reasonable accommodation; and
(4) he was discriminated against because of his disability.''
Defendants argued plaintiff failed to prove whether he could perform his
job with or without reasonable accommodation.142 According to the court,
it is well established when an employee does not come to work, he cannot
133Id.
1341d. at 362.

'"Corr,27 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
136Id
137Id

8
13
1d.
'"Id. at 363.

140Id
14id. at 364.
142Id. at 366.
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perform any of his job functions. 143 It is undisputed plaintiff did not
attend work from December 9, 1994 through December 9, 1995, and
plaintiff was unable to return to work until February 23, 1996, at the
earliest.144 Plaintiff argued he had not been advised of the reduced leave
of absence requirement under the January 20, 1995 CBA, and if he had
been, he would have returned to work earlier. 14' The court held employers
have no duty to inform union employees of their rights under the CBA,
unless an employee requests a copy of the CBA. 46 Plaintiff offered no
proof that he had actually requested the new CBA.147 Although plaintiff
had a diagnosis of mental illness, plaintiff failed to establish he was able
to perform the functions of his job with or without reasonable
accommodation.14 S
Regarding the ADA claims against the MTA employees in their
individual capacities, the court held that they could not be liable under the
ADA.' 49 The court relied upon a previous decision by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals disallowing individual liability under Title VII claims,
and upon decisions by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Courts ofApp eal
that individuals who are not employers under the ADA cannot be held
liable. 50
The court also granted the union's motion for summary judgment,
because the union had no authority to terminate plaintiff, and therefore,
could not be liable under the ADA.' 5 ' The court also held plaintiff could
not bring suit against the Union under the Labor Management Relations
Act, because the statute of limitations had expired. 1"2 Corrv MTA Long
IslandBus, 27 F. Supp. 2d 361 (E.D.N.Y 1998).

143Id

144Id.
14'Corr,27 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
14SiM
147Id."
14S1d. at 369.

14Id. at 369,370.
S'Corr, 27 F. Supp. at 370.
MId. at 371.
"2Id. at 372.
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ADA Requires Limitations On Major Life
Activities to be Long Term
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the
Americans with Disability Act (ADA) requires limitations on major life
activities to be long term."5 3 Plaintiffs won ajury verdict. 54 Defendants
filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, which was denied by the
District of New York. 5
United States District Court for the Eastern
156
Defendants then appealed that decision.
Plaintiffs were three veteran police officers of the Suffolk County
Police Department (SCPD).'57 All three were assigned to light duty due
to injuries. 158 A light duty assignment usually means the officer cannot
perform the regular duties of a police officer, but is still able to perform
some police duties.'59 All three of the plaintiffs were relieved of duties
involving the risk of physical confrontation.1 60 In February of 1993, all
three of the officers were denied promotion.16 ' Plaintiffs subsequently
filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), obtained right to sue letters from the EEOC, and filed a
complaint against the SCPD and the County of Suffolk.1 62 The complaint
alleged the officers were qualified for the higher positions, but they
were
63
denied the positions because of their disabilities under the ADA.
Each of the officers submitted evidence at trial of some physical
impairments, but the court did not find the impairments substantially
limited the officers in any major life activities as required under the
ADA.' 64 The court applied the three-step analysis ofBragdon v. Abbott' 65

"'Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635 (2nd Cir. 1998).

'541d. at 638.
"6Id.

7Id. at 639.
"'Colwell, 158 F.3d at 639.
1I9d.

16Id.

161.id.
162Id.

"6'Colwell, 158 F. 3d at 639.
'64Id.at 641.
6118

S. Ct.. 2196 (1998).
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to determine whether a disability is covered under the ADA.'6 5 The first
step is to determine whether plaintiff suffered a physical or mental
impairment.' 67 Second, a major life activity must be identified. ' Lastly,
the impairment must substantially limits the major life activity
identified. 69 The court held although the impairments did affect major
life activities, the impairments did not substantially limit any major life
activities.' 70 The disabilities, of-which the officers complained, involved
standing and sitting for extended periods of time and lifting objects."7
However, for an impairment substantially to limit amajor life activity, the
court held the limitations must be long term.' 72 Because the disabilities
of the officers could be ameliorated by getting up and moving around, the
disabilities were limiting only for the short term, and therefore were not
covered by the ADA."73
The court heldbecause the officers' impairments did not substantially
limit major life activities, the officers were not covered under the ADA.'7 4
Colivell v. Suffolk County PoliceDep t, 158 F.3d 635 (2nd Cir. 1998).

Physician Suffering From Attention Deficit
DisorderNot Qualified Individua
\ Under ADA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held a physician
suffering from Attention Deficit Disorder did not constitute a "qualified
individual" under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)."3
Plaintiff practiced neurology at The Neuromedical Center in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana since 198 1.17 6 At the suggestion of a colleague, plaintiff
was tested and diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder

I65Colwell, 158 F.3d at 640.

167Id..
163Id.

1691d.
170
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(ADHD) in 1984.177 Four months later, plaintiff's employment was
terminated.'78 Plaintiffphysician brought a claim for wrongful discharge,
contending the discharge was based on his diagnosis of ADHD and
although reasonable accommodations were recommended to deal with the
situation, they were never implemented.' 79 Defendant employer asserted
some of plaintiffs work problems predated the diagnosis, and the
termination was with cause. 80 Originally filed in state court and removed
to federal court on the basis ofthe ADA claim, the court granted summary
judgment on the ADA claim and remanded remaining claims to state
court. 8' Both parties appealed. 2
The court held the administrative portions of plaintiff s employment,
such as studying and analyzing tests and blood work, were essential.'83
The administrative aspects of the job were crucial to the position, and as
a neurologist, plaintiff was one of the few employees who could have
undertaken such tasks.' 84 The court also held the highly specialized
administrative portion of the job could not be transferred to another
employee lacking similar expertise without completely undermining the
position.'
The court also held due to plaintiffs condition it was impossible for
him to continue in his position as a neurologist because necessary
accommodations were not possible. 8 6 The ADA neither requires
employers to relieve employees of essential job functions or modify
existing duties nor requires an employer to accommodate employees when
187
the employee poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others.
The decision was partly based on plaintiff s admitted concern for patients'
safety in his presence due to short-term memory problems and his lack of
confidence.18 8 The court also held defendant employer was not required
to accommodate plaintiff in light of a decision to take or to refrain from
77
1
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taking medication.' 8 9 As a result of the facts presented, no issue of
material fact existed whether plaintiff was a "qualified individual" under
the ADA.190 The court also held the district court did not abuse the wide
discretion available in refusing to hear state claims. 9 ' As such, the district
court's grant of summary judgment and remand decision was affirmed. 92
Robertson v. Neuromedical Center, 161 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1998).

EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Termination Triggers Employer's Duty to Notify
Employee of COBRA Benefits
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
termination of employees triggers the employers' obligation to notify the
discharged employees of their rights under the Comprehensive Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).' 93

Plaintiff employee sued

defendant employer for failure to notify her of her COBRA rights.'
Initially the employee worked at the employer's facility.19 ' After moving
out of state the employee continued to work for the employer out of her
home.'9 6 The employer closed the plant, at which the employee originally
worked, but never contacted her regarding her insurance and payroll
status. 97 Subsequently, the employee received notice her employment
was terminated. 9 ' However, the employee was never notified of her right
to elect continued health coverage under COBRA. 9 The employee sued
the employer alleging a violation of COBRA, when the employer failed
to notify her of her COBRA rights.2° In its motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim the employer claimed: the employee's termination did not

9ld.
'"Robertson, 161 F.3d at 395.
191

1 Id. at 296.

9Id.

.93Fenner v. Favorite Brand Int'l, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. 111. 1998).
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result in loss of coverage; the employer was not the plan administrator
under COBRA; and the employee did not allege an actual injury.2 1 The
court rejected each of these arguments.2 2 The court held according to
COBRA and the employee's health plan, the date of termination triggered
the employer's duty to notify the employee.20 3 In addition, the court found
the employer to be the plan administrator according to the statute's
definitions. 204 Finally, the court held, under the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act, an employee need not allege an actual injury to
recover a civil penalty. 25 Accordingly, the court denied the employer's
motion to dismiss. 206 Fennerv. FavoriteBrandInternational,25F.Supp.
2d 870 (N.D. Ill. 1998).

Adoption Leave Under FMLA Expires
Twelve Months After Adoption
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit established
"placement for adoption" does not include relocation of children adopted
three years earlier.207 The issue on appeal before the court was whether
plaintiff was fired in retaliation for plaintiff enacting his rights under the
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). °8
Plaintiff held ajob at National Western's actuarial department as an
assistant actuary.20 9 In 1992, the company implemented the requirement
all assistant actuaries had to earn examination credits by May 1994 in
order to continue working.210 In 1994, plaintiff had not earned any
credits.211 The company extended the deadline to earn the credits to
November 1994.212 In April 1992, plaintiff adopted two children living in

201
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the Philippines and their visas were granted on November 2, 1994.213 In
February 1995, plaintiff then requested leave, under the auspices of
FMLA, to bring the children to Texas. 1 4 Prior to his leave, on March 2S,
1995, plaintiff received a memorandum stating he must earn his
examination credits by May 1995 to continue employment with the
company.215 Plaintiffreturned from his leave in July
of 1995 and was then
21 6
fired for failing to earn his examination credits.
The issue presented on appeal was whether plaintiff s employment
was terminated in violation of FMLA. 1 7 The court examined the
provisions under FMLA and determined that plaintiff was not protected
under FMLA.218' The court reasoned plaintiffs situation did not fit under
FMLAbecause leave for adoption expires after atwelve monthperiod and
plaintiffsought leave three years after adoption ofthe two children.2 9 The
court also determined the provisions of FMLA intended leave for
situations when a child is placed in a home prior to the finalization of the
adoption. 220
The court then stated, even ifFMLA did apply to plaintiff's situation,
defendant would not have violated the Act because of the reason for
plaintiffs termination of employment.22 Plaintiff was aware of the
requirement of examination credits and he admitted that he could have
acquired the examination credits prior to his leave.'
Based on these
findings, the court determined no reasonable juror could conclude
defendant had violated FMLA.mB Accordingly, the court reversed the jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff.224 Bocalbosv. NationalWest Life Ins. Co.,
162 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 1998).
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IMMUNITY
OSHA Inspectors Granted Immunity Under
FTCA Discretionary Exception
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held the Federal
Tort Claim's Act (FTCA) discretionary exception granted immunity to
inspectors employed by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). 225 The issue on appeal was whether the FTCA's
discretionary exception precluded plaintiffs claim of negligence by the
OSHA employees.226
Plaintiff suffered ghastly injuries during a work-related incident. 2 7
She worked at a manufacturing plant stamping innersoles for shoes.228
When she dropped a glove behind a workbench and leaned over to pick it
up, her hair was pulled into the vacuum created by the drive shaft of a
machine delivering power to an adjacent "die-out" machine. 229 OSHA
compliance officers had inspected the plant in 1975 and 1978, but had
failed to note any hazard of the guarding of the die-out machine.2 30 Less
than a week after plaintiff s injury OSHA conducted an inspection, which
determined the arrangement of the die-out machine violated OSHA
standards.231
The court addressed the issue of whether the discretionary function
exception applied as a defense for defendant.232 First, the court compared
a parallel provision of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA)
and noted vast differences between the two laws.233 The court discussed
Congress' mandate ofspecific details for inspections under MSHA, unlike
the general provisions for OSHA.234 The court examined the relatively
few mandatory directives established for OSHA by Congress and
determined the law prescribed no specific regimen for OSHA during its
'Irving
26
2'
1d.at
7
2'Id. at
"Id. at
229Id. at

v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 169 (1st Cir. 1998).
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inspections." The court then considered whether the latitude given to
compliance officers under OSHA was consistent with the discretionary
function exception.2 6 The court determined the lower court erred in
failing to extend to the compliance officers the discretion given to the
Secretary ofLabor. 237 The court further discussedpolicy-based discretion,
interpreting the Act's purpose was to maintain a "satisfactory standard of
safety, not to guarantee absolute safety."2' ' The court proclaimed OSHA
inspections realistically could not inspect every single item in every single
plant.29 Therefore, the court concluded the primary responsibility to
maintain a safe work environment rested with the employers.249 The court
noted the discretionary function exception served to limit what could
otherwise result in "far-flung liability." 41 The court then determined
congress established a reasonable balance by requiring specification of
acts in order to have liability.242 Based on these conclusions, the court
reversed the lower court decision and granted immunity to the government
based on FTCA's discretionary function exception.243 Irving V. United
States, 162 F.3d 154 (1st Cir. 1998).

INSURANCE
Claims Of Disability Discrimination Against
HMO Survive Summary Judgment
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San
Antonio Division, denied summary judgment to defendant HMO on all
but one count of discrimination. 244 Plaintiffs, patients and physicians,
alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
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Rehabilitation Act due to various practices, which plaintiffs claimed were
aimed at inducing the sickest and most chronically ill enrollees of
2 45
defendant HMO to change to other insurance plans.
Plaintiffs claimed defendant discriminated against sick enrollees by
forcing them to wait longer than others for medical treatment or by
denying them medical services altogether.2 46 Defendant contends
summary judgment is appropriate because plaintiffs did not exhaust their
administrative remedies, plaintiffs lacked standing under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act, and plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action.2 47 The
court first addressed defendant's claim the court lacked jurisdiction
because plaintifffailed to seek resolution through administrative remedies
provided by the Medicare Act.248 The court found plaintiff was not
seeking relief under the Medicare Act, but under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.2 49 Consequently, the court denied defendant's motion
for summary judgment based on a defense of a lack ofjurisdiction.25 °
Next, the court addressed defendant's contention plaintiffs lacked
standing because they were not entitled to monetary damages under the
ADA, could not prove a likelihood of future discrimination, and because
" ' The court found plaintiffs
all plaintiffs were not defendant's enrollees.25
were seeking monetary relief under the Rehabilitation Act.252
Furthermore, because plaintiffs offered evidence of a cost-sharing
agreement, which could result in future discrimination, the court found
plaintiffs could prove a likelihood of future discrimination.25 3 The court
also found at least one plaintiff was still enrolled as a member of
defendant IMO.254 Consequently, the court dismissed defendant's
contention plaintiffs' action
failed because not all plaintiffs were currently
255

enrolled in the HMO.

24
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The court then addressed defendant's claim plaintiff's complaint
failed to state a cause of action. 2 6 The court found the complaint alleged
numerous instances where disabled enrollees were forced to wait for long
periods of times, while non-disabled enrollees did not have to wait for
similarly long periods. 7 Further, the court found the complaint alleged
instances when disabled patients were denied medical treatment, as well
as financial incentives designed to allow discrimination to occur
naturally. 58 Consequently, the court found plaintiffs' complaint sufficient
to sustain summaryjudgment.2 9 Zamora v. Health Texas MedicalGroup
of San Antonio, 345 F. Supp. 2d 433 (W.D. Tex. 1998).

Defendants Have No Duty Under ERISA
To Disclose Physician Compensation Terms
To Plan Participants
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held
under an Employment Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) plan,
a healthcare company has no duty to disclose the physician compensation
terms to the plan participants.2 60 The court also held ERISA preempted
plaintiff's state law tort claims.261
Plaintiffs filed suit alleging breach of federal and state fiduciary
duties in failing to disclose physician-compensation arrangements. 2 6
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. 263 The parties agreed
there were no express duties to disclose physician-compensation
agreements to plan members, however plaintiffs argued there was an
implied duty to make the disclosures through the fiduciary-duty wording
of ERISA.264 According to cited case law, the court held courts were not
allowed to add disclosure requirements to ERISA because Congress
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257M.
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would have added the disclosure requirements if it had so intended. 65 The
court stated if plaintiffs were requesting a necessary addition to the
disclosure requirements, then the request should be made to congress, not
the court.266 The court granted defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
breach-of-duty claim under ERISA.267 The court also dropped the statelaw claims asserted by plaintiffs, because they were preempted by
ERISA.268 Ehlmann v. KaiserFoundationHealth Plan, 20 F. Supp. 2d
1010 (7D. Tex. 1998).

MALPRACTICE
Plaintiff Cannot Compel Production of Documents From
Medical Review Committee When Documents
Are Protected by Federal Statute
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a lower
court's denial ofplaintiff's motion to compel production of all peer review
documentation concerning plaintiff's treatment.2 69 The court agreed with
the lower court "the documents requested were 'absolutely immune from
discovery' under the [Peer Review Improvement] Act [of 1982] because
'the responses to [peer review] inquiries, as well as the inquiries
themselves were granted and created by [the peer review committee] ..
as part of quality review of medical treatment.270
In 1991, defendant physician treated plaintiff for diverticulitis, a type
of inflammation of the large bowel.2 11 Plaintiff subsequently underwent
surgery to have an infected section of bowel removed.72 Eleven days
after surgery, plaintiffrequired a second surgery due to peritonitis, which
necessitated a reversible colostomy.2 3 Additional outpatient surgery was
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required to repair the constriction around the colostomy opening 7 4
Plaintiff subsequently sued alleging improper medical care in connection
with his hospitalization, surgeries, and post-surgical care. 7 5
The court noted the Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982 [PRIA]
was enacted to review "the quality and appropriateness of health care
provided... to Medicare beneficiaries" by determining if the treatment
received was "reasonable and medically necessary," and if "the quality of
such services [met] professionally recognized standards of health care
...
i 276 The peer review committee, which made the determination,
operated under strict confidentiality. 2n The court noted congress had
exempted the peer review process from the Freedom of Information Act,
immunized many peer-review documents from subpoena and discovery
proceedings, and prohibited most of peer review documents27 3 Despite
plaintiff seeking to compel release of peer review documents from
defendant instead of the committee itself, the court found prohibition
against discovery was not destroyed "simply because the materials.., are
in the hands of the physician who is the subject of the... quality review
system.2 79 Therefore, the district court decision was affirmed.2
Armstrong v. Dwyer, 155 F.3d 211 (3rd Cir. 1998).

Seeking Additional Prescription Refills Without
Scheduling Follow-up Appointments
Equals Self-Treatment
The Supreme Court ofMinnesota held a prescription refill by a dentist did
not constitute "continuing treatment" for the purposes oftolling the statute
of limitations, because as a matter of law, the patient had effectively
terminated the doctor-patient relationship six months earlier by failing to
schedule follow-up treatment. 281

22745Annstrong, 155 F.3d at 213.
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In 1985, plaintiff patient commenced a seven and one-half year
course of treatment for temporomandibularjoint dysfunction (TMJ) with
defendant dentist.2 82 In 1992, plaintiff received a prescription for Motrin
to alleviate the inflammation associated with TMJ.2 83 Plaintiffs last visit
with defendant was in December 1992.2 4 At that time, plaintiff was told
to continue taking the Motrin as needed for pain and to return for an
examination in six to eight weeks.285 While plaintiff did not return for
additional treatment, she did seek to refill the Motrin prescription.286
When contacted by the pharmacy, defendant did authorize another two
287
refills of the drug.
The appellate court agreed with plaintiffs contention the course of
treatment continued up to the additional refills authorized by defendant.288
The court applied three factors to determine when treatment ceases
between a physician and patient:
(1) whether the physician-patient relationship was for treatment
of an illness,
(2) whether the physician was attending and examining the
patient, and
(3) whether additional treatment was required.2" 9
Applying these factors the court found plaintiff had ceased treatment
because the second and third factors were not met.290 The court reasoned
plaintiffs actions in seeking additional pharmacy refills without
scheduling additional follow-up appointments represented selftreatment. 29 1 The court held self-treatment did not toll the statute of
limitations governing medical malpractice.292 Therefore, because the
statute of limitations had expired, the court reversed the court of appeals
decision.293 Ciardelliv. Rindal, 582 N. W.2d 910 (Minn. 1998).
2
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Eight-year Statute of Repose Violates
Washington State Constitution
The Supreme Court of Washington held a statute of repose violated the
privileges and immunities clause of the Washington state constitution
because the provision arbitrarily denied reasonable discovery to a group
of patients unable to detect their injuries within eight years of the alleged
negligent act or omission.294
In 1980, plaintiff patient had undergone radiation treatment for a
cancerous growth in her eyes.295 In 1995, plaintiff discovered the radiation
treatment had produced an injury to her right eye.29 6 In 1996, plaintiff
learned the injury in her left eye was also due to radiation treatment.2? 7
Plaintiff sued defendant
hospital alleging negligently administered
298
treatment.
radiation
The court noted the Washington state legislature enacted an eightyear statute of repose in response to a perceived medical malpractice
insurance crisis. 299 The crisis was purportedly due to increased medical
malpractice claims creating uncertainty in calculating appropriate payment
reserves.3 °° However, the court continued, information available prior to
enactment of the legislation indicated the eight-year repose provision
would not resolve the uncertainty in calculating payment reserves3 "' Less
than one percent of the medical malpractice claims reported was over
eight years old. 2 The court concluded classification of medical
malpractice claims, under an eight-year statute of repose, could not avert
or resolve a malpractice insurance crisis." 3 Therefore, the court reasoned
the eight-year repose provision did not have a rational relationship to the
statutory intent.3' 4 Accordingly, the court reversed and granted summary

'DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr., 960 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
'9Id. at 920.
961d.
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judgment in favor of defendant." 5 DeYoung v. ProvidenceMed. Cr., 960
P.2d 919 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).

Pathologists Owe No Duty of Care to Physicians
Who Rely on Pathologists' Findings
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, held pathologists
and hospitals do not owe a duty of care to surgeons who allegedly perform
unnecessary operations, 30 6 when a pathologist's misdiagnosis is not the
proximate cause of surgeon's financial and emotional injuries. 0 7
The patient had a lump in her breast examined by plaintiff surgeon.30 8
Initially, defendant pathologist examined a tissue specimen from the
patient and determined it was benign.31 Upon re-examining the specimen,
the pathologist diagnosed a malignancy. 310 Subsequently, the surgeon
performed a mastectomy on the patient. 31 ' Following the surgery,
additional pathological tests revealed no malignancy existed.312 Upon
learning the sample taken from her breast was not malignant, the patient
filed a negligence suit against the surgeon and launched a media campaign
to advertise her allegedly negligent medical care. 313 The surgeon claimed
injury as a result of this negative publicity and filed the instant suit to
314
recover damages.
The court addressed the surgeon's claim the pathologists and hospital
negligently misdiagnosed the patient. 31' The surgeon based his claim on
a medical malpractice theory.316 The court rejected plaintiffs theory
reasoning there was no physician-patient relationship between the surgeon
and the pathologists or the hospital. 317 Similarly, the court refused to hold
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the pathologists of the hospital liable under a theory ofnegligence.318 The
court refused to extend a negligence theory of duty of care because there
was a lack of privity between the parties.3 19 The court accepted a
"slippery slope" argument that extending such a duty of care would result
in a proliferation of litigation. 32 ° Additionally, the court noted patients
would not benefit from such lawsuits because a duty of care between
patients and physicians already exists.32' As a result, the court affirmed
the decision of the lower court.3 n Megally v. LaPorta, 679 N.YS.2d 649

(NY. 1998).

MENTAL HEALTH
Administration of Judicially Ordered
Antipsychotic Medication to Inmates
Awaiting Trial Impermissible
The United States Court of'App eals for the Ninth Circuit held aphysician,
who administeredjudicially ordered antipsychotic medication to an inmate
awaiting criminal trial, did not act unreasonably in interpreting thejudge's
order as authorizing the medication.3
Defendant was charged with dealing drugs, and was found
incompetent by two experts who also opined defendant did have a
substantial probability ofbeing restored to competency. 32 4 Defendantwas
committed to a mental institution for treatment, where he was forcibly
administered antipsychotic medication when he became verbally abusive,
threatening, and "unmanageable." 32 Defendant sued the treating
physicians under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.326 The district court ruled the
physician had acted under authority of a valid court order because forced

3181d. at 653.

3201d.
321Afegally, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
322d. at 656.
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medication was within the contemplation of defendant's "treatment"
to
327
restore him to competency, and was in defendant's best interests.
On appeal, the court stated forcibly administering antipsychotic
medication to a defendant awaiting trial was impermissible, absent
overriding justification and a finding of medical appropriateness. 328 The
court held although the physician's administration of the medication was
not justified in the particular circumstances, the physician was
nevertheless immune from liability because he was not unreasonable in
interpreting the judge's order as authorizing his action.329 The district
court's judgment was affirmed because the physician's reasonable belief
his conduct was lawful was sufficient to secure qualified immunity.330
Kulas v. CSO Valdez, 159 F.3d453 (9th Cir. 1998).

Judicial Hearings Required to Determine Whether
Inmates May Be Forcibly Medicated to
Render Them Competent to Stand Trial
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held criminal
defendant inmates are entitled to judicial hearings to determine whether
they maybe forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs in order to render
them competent to stand trial.33 '
Criminal defendant, diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, was
declared mentally incompetent to stand trial.332 It was determined
defendant had a substantial probability in the near future of attaining the
capacity to stand trial.333 Defendant refused to take antipsychotic
medication his multidisciplinary team determined would be the least
restrictive alternative to restore defendant to competency.334 However, the
medical center at which defendant was hospitalized was aware defendant
could not be forcibly medicated without an administrative hearing and
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approval from the district court. 3 Defendant moved for an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether non-dangerous pretrial inmates can be
forcibly medicated to render them competent to stand trial without a
judicial hearing.336
The Sixth Circuit considered and balanced four factors: defendant's
interests, the government's interests, the value ofthe suggestedprocedural
requirements, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of defendant's
rights. 37
Concerning defendant's interests, the court discussed
defendant's First Amendment interest in avoiding forced medication
because it could interfere with defendant's ability to communicate; his
Fifth Amendment liberty interest in being free from bodily intrusion; and
his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, which could be implicated if
defendant appeared sedated, restless, or unresponsive due to medication
side-effects.33 s The court stated the government's interest in rendering
defendiat competent to stand trial was substantial.33 9 The court
determined the value of ajudicial hearing was highbecause defendant was
not dangerous to himself or others and the treatment was not in his
medical interests.34
The court held due process considerations required ajudicial hearing
on whether defendant could be forcibly medicated in order to render him
competent to stand trial.14' The court held the lower court making the
determination should apply a strict scrutiny standard." Defendant's case
was remanded so that such a proceeding could be conducted. 4 3 United
States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d947 (6th Cir. 1998).

3351d.
33Brandon, 158 F.3d at 950.

3371d. at 953.

31d. at 953-54.

33 1d. at 954.

3Id. at 955.
41
Brandon, 158 F.3d at 955.

342Id. at 955-57.
33Id. at 956.
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Involuntary Administration of Mental
Health Services Implicates
Fundamental Liberty Interests
The Supreme Court of Illinois held involuntary administration of mental
health care services implicates fundamental liberty interests, and3 statutes
governing applicable procedures should be construed narrowly. "
Petitioners, the State ofIllinois and the Department ofMental Health
and Developmental Disabilities (Department), appealed the involuntary
commitment of Barbara H. (patient) to a mental health facility. 345 A
hearing was held in the circuit court, after petitions were filed to have the
patient involuntarily admitted to a mental health center (allegedly due to
her inability to care for her basic physical needs), and involuntarily
medicated with psychotropic medication.346 The public defender waived
the patient's appearance at the hearing pursuant to an Illinois Mental
Health Code provision (provision).347 The hearing was subsequently held
without the patient, and the circuit court granted both petitions. 348 The
patient appealed on the ground the provision authorizing the attorney to
waive her appearance was unconstitutional.349
The appellate court held the patient had a significant liberty interest
under the fourteenth amendment in being free from unjustified civil
commitment and in being protected from the involuntary administration
ofpsychotropic medication.350 The court further held she had the right to
attend the hearing unless she had knowingly and intelligently waived her
right to do so or unless her conduct was so disruptive as to require her
" ' That court found the provision unconstitutional because it
exclusion.35
allowed the attorney to waive the patient's presence without any judicial

'"In
re Barbara H.,702 N.E.2d 555, 562 (Il1.1998).
34

SId. at 557.
3461d"
347Id.
348Id
34"In
0

3"Id
3S1Id.

re BarbaraH.,702 N.E.2d t 557-58.
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determination the patient was unable to make a rational decision or
whether her presence would have disrupted the hearing."
The Supreme Court of Illinois held the provision invalid without
reaching the issue of constitutionality because the attorney acting on
behalf of the patient lacked the authority to so act. 353 The provision at
issue did not provide for such a power to be vested in the patient's
attorney; therefore, she was wrongly deprived of her right to be present at
the hearing. 354 The Supreme Court of Illinois also held the hearing was
fatally defective because the court had not made a determination of the
patient's ability to attend without substantial risk she would suffer serious
physical or emotional harm, or disrupt the proceeding. -5 The court
affirmed the appellate court's judgment as to the invalidity ofthe patient's
involuntary commitment and involuntary administration of medication,
and held if the State believed the patient still needed involuntary
commitment, it must reinitiate proceedings in the circuit court."-6 In re
BarbaraH., 183111. 2d 482 (I. 1998).

Mental Health Professionals Required
To Warn Third Parties
The Supreme Court ofPennsylvania adopted the duty to warn requirement
established in Tarasoffv. Regents of University of California,357 imposing
an affirmative duty on mental health professionals to warn third parties of
a specific and immediate threat of serious bodily harm.3 -9
Plaintiff was the administratrix of the estate of a victim of violence
by a patient of defendant mental health facility. 35 9 The patient informed
his psychiatrist, an employee of the mental health facility, he was going
to kill the third party victim.3 6 After receiving assurances the patient
would not harm the victim, the patient was allowed to leave the center

" 21d. at 588-95.

.. 3Id. at 559.
3mIn
re BarbaraH., 702 N.E. at 559.
3 51d. at 562.
5
"Id.at 562-63.
37551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
3'Emerich v. Philadelphia Ctr. For Human Dev., 720 A.2d 1032 (Pa. 199S).
9
"60
1d. at 1034.
' 1d. at 1035.
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where he was being treated. 6 ' Subsequently, the psychiatrist received a
phone call from the victim inquiring of the whereabouts of the patient.362
During this phone conversation, the psychiatrist warned the victim not to
return to the apartment the victim and the patient had previously s'hared.3 63
Nevertheless, the victim ignored the psychiatrist's instructions and went
to the apartment where she was killed by the patient.
The court first addressed whether the psychiatrist had a duty to warn
a third party of a foreseeable risk ofharm.3 65 After reviewing the holdings
in the court's jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions, including California
in Tarasoff, 66 the court found a special relationship exists between mental
health workers and their patients.367 Consequently, the court held mental
health workers have a duty to warn third parties of potential harm from
their patients.36 The court next outlined the scope of the duty mental
health professionals owe to third parties .369 The court found mental health
professionals have a duty to warn third parties if the professional
determines, or should have determined, his patient poses a serious risk of
violence to another.370 In determining whether a mental health
professional should have known his patient posed a serious risk of harm
to another, courts should look to other health professionals in establishing
the standard of care owed to the third party.371' The court continued the
warning to the potential victim should be narrowly tailored to achieve the
intended goal, while preserving the integrity of the patient-therapist
relationship to the fullest extent possible. 37 Furthermore, the court
advised, the duty only arises when the patient has communicated a
specific and immediate threat of serious harm to a readily identifiable
3
victim.

37

361

1d.

362

Id

3

fEmerich, 720 A.2d at 1035.

3
6Id.
365

1d.

'6551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
367Emerich, 720 A.2d at 1037.
3681d.

369Id. at

1039.
370Id. at 1040.

371id.

2
3"
Emerich, 720 A.2d at 1040.
"Id.

1999]

CASE BRIEFS

After clearly establishing the duty the psychiatrist owed to the victim,
the court determined whether defendant fulfilled this duty by warning the
victim not to return to the apartment.374 The court considered the victim's
knowledge the patient was violent and had contacted the psychiatrist to
learn the patient's whereabouts led to the inference the victim was
concerned about her own safety.375 The court found these facts coupled
with the instructions by the psychiatrist to the victim not to return to the
apartment were sufficient to satisfy the psychiatrist's duty to warn the
third party.376 Consequently, the court granted summary judgment to the
defendant health care center.37 Emerich v. PhiladelphiaCtr.forHuman
Development, 720 A.2d 1032 (1998).

NEGLIGENCE
Proof of Actual Exposure to HIV
Required For Claim
The Supreme Court of Illinois held although an individual need not show
a likelihood of developing acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)
in the future as a result of exposure to the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV), proof of actual exposure to the HIV is necessary for a valid
8
37

claim.

Plaintiff was employed in the office of a surgeon in Illinois. 3
Plaintiffs duties included scheduling appointments, cleaning the office,
and emptying the wastebaskets.3S0 One day when emptying the trash,
plaintiff pressed down in the wastebasket to compact the garbage and to
remove the plastic liner.38 l When doing so, plaintiff felt a twinge, and
when she looked down, her hand was bleeding. 3 Plaintiff then noticed

3741d. at 1044.
37

SId. at 1045.

76

3 1d.
"MEmerich,720 A.2d at 1045.
37"Macja v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084 (1998).
3171d. at 409.

310Id. at 410.
3811d.

3321d.
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a scalpel in the wastebasket.383 Plaintiff saw not only her own blood on
the scalpel, but also dried blood and a clear substance.384 After consulting
a physician, plaintiff went to a nearby emergency room for treatment.38"
The cut required six stitches and plaintiff was tested for HIV. 386 This test
3 87
was negative, as were two others conducted three and nine months later.
After the incident, one of the physicians who worked in the office did not
return to work for a few months.388 Plaintiff believed this was due to HIV
or AIDS related illnesses.389 Plaintiff filed a complaint against the
physicians, alleging negligence, dangerous business activities and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 390 Defendants filed a motion for
summaryjudgment, whichwas granted by the trial judge.39 ' The appellate
court affirmed the circuit court decision.392 Plaintiff subsequently
appealed.393
The Supreme Court of Illinois granted the motion for appeal,
consolidating the case with another.394 Plaintiffs in both cases asserted
actual exposure to HIV should not serve as a prerequisite to recovery;
instead, a fear of contracting AIDS should be recognized as reasonable
given the individual circumstances of a case.395 The court found this
argument unpersuasive.396 Finding a majority of courts considering
similar claims required a showing of actual exposure to HIV, the court
held without proof of actual exposure, a claim based on fear would be
speculative.397 Therefore, the court held a requirement of actual exposure
to HIV is necessary to distinguish claims based on conjecture from those
based on a genuine fear of contracting the disease. 398 The court thus

383Macja, 701 N.E.2d at 410.
3
8
41d.
3851d "

3861d.
3871d. at 410-11.
38
Macja, 701 N.E.2d at 411.
389
1d.

391Id
3911d. at 412.
39id. at 413.
393Macja, 701 N.E.2d at 413.
394
1d.
39
Sld. at 417.
396
1d.
3971d. at 420.
3
"Macja, 701 N.E.2d at 420.
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affirmed the previous grant of summary judgment inboth casesY' Macja
v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084 (71l. 1998).

Physicians Defending Malpractice Claims
Cannot Elicit Testimony Concerning
Another Physician's Negligence
The Supreme Court of Virginia held physicians in negligence actions
cannot elicit testimony regarding another physician's negligence, when
those physicians had settled claims against them, and their negligence was
not a superseding, intervening cause in apatient's death '3 Plaintiffestate
filed suit against defendant physician for breach of standard of care and
negligence resulting in the death of the patient. 40 1 Defendant physician
initially treated the patient for cardiac symptoms. 4 12 When defendant
physician went off duty the patient's care was turned over to a second
physician." The second physician relied on defendant physician's
4
workup of the patient in deciding to discharge the patient 1
Subsequently, patient suffered a fatal heart attack 40 5
The question before the court was whether the trial court properly
admitted the testimony of the second emergency room physician: -% The
court reasoned the testimony should not have been admitted because the
second physician's negligent conduct was not a superseding cause of the
patient's death.4 °7 The second physician's conduct alone would not have
resulted in death without the defendant physician's contributing
negligence. 4 Accordingly, the court reversed the decision of the trial
court and remanded the case for a new trial." Atkinson v. Scheer, 508
S.E.2d 68 (Va. 1998).

"9Id. at 424.
40
v. Scheer, 508 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Va. 1998).

4 1Atkinson

0' d. at 69.

4

4

02Id.

4"Id. at 70.
0Id.
4
'SAtkinson, 508
4
'Id.
4
17Id. at 71-72.

4031d.
4

19Id. at 72.

S.E.2d at 70.
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Defendants Entitled to Qualified Immunity Even Though
Complaint Meets Threshold for Claim Under ADA
and Rehabilitative Act
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held a
wheelchair bound arrestee was denied post-arrest transportation
appropriate under the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) for public services, as well as the Rehabilitation Act.4 10 However,
the court concluded police officials were entitled to qualified immunity in
their individual capacities from arrestee's cause of action.4 '
In 1992, plaintiff, a paraplegic requiring a wheelchair, was arrested
for trespassing following a confrontation in a bar.412 Defendant police
department, as part ofits standard operating procedure, dispatched apatrol
wagon to transport plaintiff to the station for processing.413 Prior to
transport, plaintiff was removed from his wheelchair, placed on a bench
in the patrol van, and secured by having his belt tied to a web mesh
located behind the bench. 4 During transport to the station, the belt came
loose and plaintiff fell to the floor, severely injuring his shoulder and
415
back.
The court held a local police department can be included within the
ADA's statutory definition of a public entity416 because, in order to
prevent discrimination, the statute must be broadly interpreted to include
the ordinary operations of any public entity. 417 Transportation of an
arrestee to the station house for processing, regardless of the involuntary
nature of the arrest, was, the court held, a service of the police within the
meaning of the ADA.41' Therefore, plaintiff was denied the benefit of
post-arrest transportation appropriate for his disability, as required under
the Title II of the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. 41 9 However, because

410

Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998).

411

1d. at 909.

412

1d.
4131d.
414
1d.
41
SGorman, 152 F.3d at 910.
416
1d. at 912.
4171d.
418
id.
419
1d. at 913.
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the statute had been in effect for only four months when plaintiff was
arrested, it could not be determined whether defendants reasonably kmew
of the statutory requirement regarding transportation of disabled
arrestees. 42 ' Accordingly, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
in their individual capacities. 41' The court affirmed the district court's
ruling.422 Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998).

National Standard of Care Applicable
In Determining Negligence in
Medical Malpractice Suits
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
plaintiff's medical expert established a national standard of care,
determined the question of negligence was for the trier of fact to decide,
and found any instructional error was harmless. 4' The court upheld ajury
verdict in favor of a prisoner's mother, who sued on behalf of the
decedent, against the District of Columbia.424 The issues raised by the
District of Columbia on appeal were whether at the initial trial there was
evidentiary insufficiency and instructional error.4
The decedent was incarcerated at the Youth Center for about a year
when he died.426 He had a significant medical history of asthma from
birth.427 During his incarceration, the decedent suffered four asthma
attacks in the summer of 1991 and another four in 1992.423 During the
summer of 1992, the decedent suffered one attack, which required
treatment at D.C. General Hospital.42 9 About two weeks later he suffered
another attack, which was more severe. 430 Plaintiff alleged the inadequate

420

Gorman, 152 F.3d at 915.

421

1d.
42Id

4

2'District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591,598, 601,602 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
1d. at 593.

424

42Sid.
426

1d"
1d.

427

428Wilson, 721 A.2d at 593.
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training ofpersonnel and the negligence of the unlicensed foreign medical
graduates caused his demise.431
On appeal defendant argued there was insufficiency of evidence to
find for plaintiff"3 2 and the court erred in the jury instructions about
licensure of physician assistants.433 On the first issue, the court reviewed
the testimony of plaintiffs expert and determined his testimony was
adequate to establish the standard of care and proximate cause. 434 The
court further determined it was the trier of fact's job to ascertain whether
the expert's testimony was reliable.435
On the second issue, the court examined the statute upon which the
jury instructions had been based.436 The court determined while the Youth
Center was not literally in the district that provided the statute, the
licensing statute might still apply to defendant because of the policy
underlying the statute. 437 Regardless, the court noted unlicensed physician
assistants were also forbidden to practice by court orders.438 Based on the
information given to the jury, the court determined, even without the
instruction in question, the jury could not possibly determine allowing
unlicensed foreign graduates to practice as physician assistants met the
standard of due care. 439 Accordingly, the lower court's denial of
defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denial
of motion for new trial were upheld 40 Districtof Columbia v. Wilson,
721 A.2d 591 (D.C.Cir. 1998).

431

Id.

4 32

1d.
433 Wilson,
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PATENTS
Doctrine of Equivalents Applied to Enjoin
Pharmaceutical Company From
Infringing Upon Rival's Patents
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in a suit for
infingement of patents related to Zantac medication, held it lacked
jurisdiction over plaintiff's U.S. Patent No. 4,521,431 ('431). 44' Further,
the court found defendant had infringed plaintiff's U.S. Patent Nos.
4,585,790 ('790) and 5,068,249 ('249). 42 Plaintiff Glaxo Wellcome held
three patents related to its Zantac medication, one of the largest selling
drugs in the world. 443 The patents at issue related to the oral and injectable
forms of Zantac, which have the active ingredient ranitidine." 4 Under
federal law it is an infringement of a patent to submit an application to the
FDA seeking approval to manufacture, use or sell a drug already claimed
in apatentbefore the patent expires." 5 Glaxo Wellcome's Zantac patents
do not expire until 2002.46 Defendant Pharmadyne informed Glaxo
Wellcome it was seeking FDA approval of an oral syrup containing
ranitidinebefore the expiration ofthepatents, claiming Glaxo Wellcome's
patents were both invalid, and unenforceable, and/or would not be
infiinged upon by its product.447
Regarding the '431 patent the court held it lacked jurisdiction to hear
claims because it was clear at trial Pharmadyne had no reason to fear civil
prosecution for producing the invention claimed inthe '431 patent. 3 The
'790 patent concerned the increase of the natural pH ofranitidine in order
to increase the shelf life of the product." 9 The '249 patent involved the
addition of an alcohol, ethanol, to the syrup to prevent the growth of
microbes.45 0 To avoid Glaxo Wellcome's patents, Pharmadyne instructed

44'Glaxo Wellcome v. Pharmadyne Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 265, 273 (D. Md. 1998).

4421d. at 288.
43Id. at 269.
"4 id.
4'4Id. at 270.
'Glaxo Wellcome, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
4Id. at 271.
4'Id. at 272.
40Id. at 273-274.
40
1d. at 277.
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its research team to formulate a ranitidine syrup without increasing the pH
or adding ethanol. 411 Pharmadyne developed a syrup using another
alcohol, propylene glycol, and raising the natural pH of ranitidine.452
The court held although Pharmadyne's product did not literally
infinge upon Glaxo Welleome's patents because of the change in the
alcohol, it did infinge under the doctrine of equivalents.4 3 "The doctrine
of equivalents protects the patent owner against infringers who make
insubstantial changes to the claimed invention, so that the accused product
may not literally read on the claims, but nonetheless appropriates the
invention. ' ,4s4 Under the doctrine of equivalents the court applied the
"function-way-result" test to determine propylene glycol performed the
same function in the same way to obtain the same result as the ethanol.455
Furthermore, the court found Pharmadyne knew propylene glycol could
be substituted for ethanol and therefore essentially copied Glaxo
Wellcome's Zantac patents.456
Thus, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for
all claims related to the '431 patent and enjoined defendant from further
infringing on the '790 and '249 patents. 457 Glaxo Wellcome v.
Pharmadyne Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D. Md. 1998).

PRODUCT LIABILITY
Pregnancy May Be Considered Harm Under
Indiana's Products Liability Statute
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held
pregnancy may be considered a harm under the Indiana products liability
statute, and plaintiffs adequately pled proximate cause.458

4

.Glaxo Wellcome, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
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S Id. at 283.
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S 1d. at 284.
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S4Id. at 283

455Md.
4 6
Glaxo Wellcome, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
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Plaintiffs are husband and wife.4 9 On May 11, 1997, plaintiffs
purchased and used a condom manufactured by Ansell, Inc. in Chicago,
Illinois.4 According to plaintiff, the condom had a hole in it, which
resulted in the wife becoming pregnant.461 Plaintiff filed a complaint in
federal court in Indiana based on diversity jurisdiction. 42 Plaintiffs
prayed for $300,000 in damages and alleged defendant was strictly liable
4
for the damage done to plaintiffs due to the defective condom.
Defendant fied a Motion to Dismiss countering
pregnancy is not a harm
4
under Indiana products liability statute. 6
Accordingto Indiana Code 34-6-2-105, "physical harm means bodily
injury, death, loss of services, and rights arising from any such injuries, as
well as sudden, major damage to property. 465 Neither party cited any case
law interpreting "physical harm" or "bodily injury," and therefore the
court looked to the Indiana state courts for guidance. 46 6 The court and
plaintiffs drew analogies to negligence cases similar to plaintiffs'
allegations, such as wrongful pregnancy based on medical negigence467
In the wrongful pregnancy cases, the district courts noted pregnancy
consistently is considered a physical harm 63s Even though plaintiffs did
not claim wrongful pregnancy, the district court interpreted rulings by
state courts as leaving open whether pregnancy could be considered a
physical harm in other types of cases.469
Defendant also argued plaintiffs had failed to plead proximate cause
adequately, because they argued the sole proximate cause of pregnancy
was the union of sperm and egg.470 Again the court used wrongful
pregnancy cases for a comparison to the case at bar.471 The court stated in
a wrongful pregnancy case, the claim alleges the defendant physician's
negligence proximately caused the pregnancy by failing to prevent the

4 9

S 1d.
4*Id. at 930.
45
4 1d.

6Id.

4

'Miceli,23 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
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union of the sperm and egg. 472 Using the wrongful pregnancy cases as
precedent, the court found plaintiffs had properly alleged a proximate
cause claim, as well as their strict liability claim, their negligence claim,
and their breach of warranty claim.473 Accordingly, the court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss Miceli v. Ansell, 23 F. Supp. 2d 929 (N.D.
Ind. 1998).

REIMBURSEMENT
Outpatient Psychiatric Services For Qualified
Medicare Beneficiaries Excluded From
Medicare Do Not Constitute Coinsurance
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held physicians
performing Medicare services for qualified Medicare Beneficiaries
(QMBs) are not necessarily entitled to 100 percent of reasonable charges,
and costs which were excluded from the Medicare fee schedule did not
constitute coinsurance to be covered by the state.474
PlaintiffRoyal Geropsychiatric Services, Inc. (RGS) is a professional
corporation composed of psychiatrists specializing in geriatric care.475
Plaintiff Ohio Psychological Association 416
(OPA) is a professional
association for psychologists licensed in Ohio. Together, plaintiffs filed
a class-action complaint requesting declaratory and injunctive relief
regarding a policy adopted by the Department of Health and Human
Services reducing reimbursement to physicians and psychologists treating
indigent, mentally ill, and elderly patients. 477 The district court granted
summary
judgment to defendants, and plaintiffs appealed contending
8
error.

47

Reviewing the district court's disposition of cross motions for
summary judgment plenary, the court held Medicare does not guarantee
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plaintiffs will receive 100 percent of reasonable charges 7 9 The court
found plaintiff's position physicians performing Medicare services are
entitled to 100 percent of their reasonable charge was unsupported by the
evidence.48 0 Looking to statutory subsections, the court found the
Medicare Act did not guarantee plaintiffs 100 percent of their reasonable
charges.4 1 Plaintiff's argument was found unsupported and based on a
flawed interpretation ofthe Medicare Act." The court therefore affirmed
the judgment of the district court.4 s3 Royal GeropsychiatricSen's., v.
Tompkins, 159 F.3d238 (6th Cir. 1998).

REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
Wisconsin Partial Birth Abortion Statute
Unconstitutionally Vague
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held plaintiff
physicians and health organization, which owned abortion clinics, were
likely to succeed on the merits of their claim a Wisconsin statute
prohibiting partial birth abortions violated the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.4' The court also held husbands ofpregnant
women had no standing to intervene in this cause of action." 5 Plaintiffs
sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute because it
mandated life imprisonment for anyone performing a partial birth
abortion. 48 6 According to the parties, the terms of the statute would
criminalize the partial birth abortion of any fetus with a heartbeat, even if
the fetus was not viable. 4" Partial birth abortions necessary to save the
life of the mother were the only exceptions to the statute!"

479

Tompkins, 159 F.3d at 243 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-

4(a)(1),4 and 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(B)).
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First, the court addressed the issue of standing.489 Based on United
States Supreme Court precedent, the court held plaintiff physicians and
Planned Parenthood had standing to seek an injunction. 49' However,
husbands of pregnant women opposed to abortion did not have standing
to intervene. 491' The court held would-be intervenors must have more than
an ideological interest, such as moral opposition to abortion, to assert
standing.492
Next, the court analyzed the issue of a preliminary injunction. 493 A
preliminary injunction is granted when the plaintiff is likely to prevail4 at
94
trial and is more likely to be harmed by the denial than the defendant.
Here, the court held the state statute burdened the right to an abortion in
three ways. 495 First, the statute protected all fetuses having a heartbeat
regardless of viability.496 A fetal heartbeat can be heard at six weeks of
gestation, although the fetus does not become viable until between 20 and
27 weeks of gestation.497 Thus the statute would unconstitutionally
prohibit some abortions.498 Second, the statute failed to provide an
exception for partial birth abortions, before or after viability, necessary to
preserve the mother's health.49 9 Third, the statute was void for
vagueness.: ° Specifically, the court noted the statute did not define any
of its terms, except "child."501 The Wisconsin legislature, the court
concluded, imposed stiff criminal penalties based on the definition of a
single word.5 2
In reaching its decision the court reasoned attaching life
imprisonment to a procedure that may be the only alternative for a
pregnant woman to protect her own health seemed contrary to the state's
purpose in enacting the statute.50 3 Based on the constitutional defects in
489
PlannedParenthood,162 F.3d
4

at 465.
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the statute the court reversed the decision of the district court with
directions to grant the preliminary injunction.' °4 PlannedParenthoodof
Wisconsin v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998).

SOCIAL SECURITY
HHS Did Not Act Arbitrarily In Failing
to Allow Inclusion of Hospital's Two Short
Cost Reports in Wage Index Calculation
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held defendant did not act arbitrarily in failing to allow the inclusion of
plaintiffs two short cost reports in the wage index calculation to
determine urban or rural classification. 50
Preview Medical Associates had purchased a hospital in Vicksburg,
Mississippi in November 1990 and renamed the hospital Preview
Regional Medical Center.10 6 Due to the purchase plaintiff filed two wage
reports, one for the last four months under the prior ownership and the
other for the first eight months under the second ownership. 7 Ifplaintiff
had filed a single report for the entire tvelve-monthperiod, plaintiffcould
have qualified for classification as urban rather than rural. ° Under an
urban classification plaintiffwould have been entitled to higher Medicare
reimbursement." ° Plaintiff sued the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (Secretary), arguing the rules were arbitrary and capricious."'
The District Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.51 '
Plaintiff appealed.512
Due to higher hospital costs in urban areas than in rural areas, the
Secretary's reimbursement rates were higher in the urban areas."3 The

"°PlannedParenthood,162 F.3d at 47 1.
'sPreview Med. Assoc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
5
5'6id. at 147.
07Id.
50sId"
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513Id.
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514
rates were partly based on the wage index for the particular area.
Hospitals were first classified by location, but could apply for
reclassification into a nearby urban area for purposes of using that area's
wage index.515 In September 1993, ParkView applied for reclassification
from a rural Mississippi area to the urban Jackson, Mississippi area during
the federal fiscal year 1995.516 A hospital must prove its average hourly
wage is at least 108 percent of the average hourly wage of hospitals in the
outlying area.517 The 1994 index was to be based on data beginning on or
after October 1, 1989 and before October 1, 1990.518 Unfortunately for
ParkView, the eight-month report could not be used as it was a month
after the end ofthe October to October window. 5'9 The calculations based
on the four-month data were just short of the 108 percent criteria-107.5948 percent.5 20 If ParkView had been able to use both the fourmonth and eight-month reports, the average hourly wage would have been
119.6589 percent of the local average.52 ' Plaintiff did not argue the
requirement of 42 C.F.R. § 412.230(e)(2)(1) was incorrect, but instead
argued the Secretary should not have relied so strictly on
data from cost
522
reports starting within the October to October window.
The court found the Secretary had valid reasons for the data
collection method for the index.523 By using the past wage reports, the
Secretary avoided any need for adjustments of existing data or any
additions ofnew data.524 Plaintiff argued the Secretary acted arbitrarily5 by
2
not adopting new rules to accommodate their special circumstances.
The court found it would have been more appropriate for plaintiff to have
contested the calculations when they were made.526 The court held it was
neither capricious nor arbitrary for the Secretary to have used the method

s14Id.
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s 171d.
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of calculation of the 1994 index.57 Therefore the court affirmed the grant
of summary judgment.528 Preview Med. Assoc v. Sialala,158 F.3d 146
(D.C.Cir. 1998).

STATUTE OF LIM TATIONS
Statute of Limitations Tolled Until
Plaintiff Learns of Injury
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held genuine
issues of material fact existed as to when the statute of limitations begins
to run in a case of breast implants plaintiff claims resulted in autoimmune
disease.529
Plaintiff sued defendant breast implant manufacturer's corporate
successor (defendant) to recover for autoimmune injuries allegedly caused
by the implants she received in 1974." 0 Although suffering from a variety
of autoimmune problems since 1977, plaintiff was not diagnosed as
having an incurable autoimmune disease until 19S. "3 Plaintiff claims
she did not realize the connection between the silicone breast implants and
the autoimmune disease until 1990.532 The district court granted summary
judgment to defendant on the basis the one-year statute of limitations
expired.533 Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment? 4Plaintiff underwent breast implant surgery in 1974."' 5 Two years
later, plaintiffbegan experiencing breast hardening, a common side effect
ofimplants.536 A procedure temporarily relieved this problem. 37 By 19S6
the breast hardening returned, and plaintiff also suffered from other health
problems including fatigue, pain and numbness, and cognitive

5

27Id.
52SId.
5'rTucker v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 158 F.3d 1046, 1050 (91h Cir. 1993).
530
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5311d.
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5 Tucker, 158 F.3d at 1047.
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dysfunction. 38 Plaintiffbegan to see an immunologist as these problems
worsened, and the physician tried to determine the cause of the health
problems (excluding the breast hardening). 39 Plaintiff continued to
experience more medical problems, and in 1988 was diagnosed with
human adjuvant disease, an incurable autoimmune disorder. 4 The cause
of the disorder was unclear, and an issue existed as to whether the
41
physician alerted plaintiff that silicone could be a cause ofherproblems.
Plaintiff decided to undergo breast implant replacement surgery in 1989,
replacing the silicone implants with saline implants.5 42 The surgery
uncovered aruptured silicone implant.543 In 1990, physicians toldplaintiff
about the rupture and told her the autoimmune disease resulted from the
ruptured implant. 44 With this knowledge, plaintiff filed a diversity suit
in federal court against defendant, the corporate successor of her silicone
breast implant company. 45 Defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting the one-year statute of limitations expired on
plaintiffs claim.546 The motion was granted, and plaintiff appealed.547
Reviewing the district court decision de novo, the court found
California rules require the date of a cause of action be delayed until
plaintiff learns of the injury and the negligence causing the injury.5 48 The
symptoms displayed by plaintiff would not have caused a reasonable
person to suspect wrongdoing by the breast implant manufacturer,
according to the court. 49 Therefore, the court held the one-year statute of
limitations should be tolled until plaintiff suspected or should have
suspected the causal relationship. 5 Given there exists a question as to
when plaintiff became aware of the relationship between her autoimmune
problems and the breast implants, the court held summary judgment was

338 d.
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precluded

51

The court therefore reversed and remanded the case for
furtherproceedings.552 Tucker v. BaxterHealthcareCorp., 158 F.3d1046
(9th Cir. 1998).

WORKER'S COMPENSATION
ERISA Beneficiary May Sue For Interest
On Delayed Benefits
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held an
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) beneficiary may
sue for interest on delayed benefits, regardless of the absence of any
previous suit claiming ERISA benefits.5 53 The issue before the court was
whether plaintiff's failure to sue for benefits under ERISA precluded him
from bringing an action for the interest accrued on the benefits during the
delay of payment. 54
Plaintiffincurred a work-related injury on July 24,1984 permanently
disabling him. In September 1993, defendant granted plaintiff disability
benefits. 56 Subsequently, the grant ofdisability benefits was retroactively
applied to include benefits starting from August 1, 19S4.117 Plaintiff's
claim requested the interest on the retroactive payment ofbenefits." ' The
issue examined by the court addressed whether plaintiff's failure to litigate
under ERISA for the benefits obviated his ability to sue for interest on
those benefits under ERISA.5 59 The court determined ERISA's lack of an
express provision for interest did not preclude plaintiffs claim.S 9 The
court examined other cases discussing the principles for prejudgment
interest under ERISA and decided concerns established in those cases
focused on making the claimant whole and preventing unjust
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enrichment.56' The court 161
applied those principles to plaintiffs case. 562
The court concluded disallowing claims for interest on delayed benefits
56 3
would provide incentive for delaying payment to injured beneficiaries.
In addition, the court determined interest was not considered "extracontractual" as it was in Massachusetts Mutual Insurance Company v.

5 65
Russell,5 64 which was not based on a compensatory remedy.
Accordingly, the lower court's decision to dismiss plaintiff s claim was

reversed. 66 Cotta v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers of Am., 165
F.3d 209 (3rd Cir. 1998).
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